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Abstract  
 
This paper explores the demographic futures of Europe by presenting two scenarios. 
The ‘Silver Century’ scenario is based on the continuation of current demographic 
trends and policies. In this scenario, Europe’s population will continue to age and 
immigration will be limited. As a result younger people will increasingly tend to con-
centrate in urban areas while the retirees, who are able, will settle in suburban and ru-
ral spaces. In the ‘Open Borders’ scenario, the EU and most of the member states will 
introduce an open and actively promoted immigration policy. Most immigrants will 
concentrate in large metropolitan areas. At the same time there will also be some 
countries and regions with very limited immigration from abroad. At the local scale 
immigration will contribute to social and spatial segregation. Hence, without the regu-
lation or at least management of types and destinations of immigration, demographic 
imbalances will not be addressed at the regional level.  Furthermore while the free-
dom of movement may have some macro-economic benefits and address population 
imbalances in some (mainly metropolitan) areas, pre-existent trends undermining both 
socio-economic cohesion and sustainable patterns of development are unlikely to be 
resolved.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
“We know much more securely than we know almost any other social or economic 
factor relating to the future that, in the place of the steady and indeed steeply rising 
level of population which we have experienced for a great number of decades, we 
shall be faced in a very short time with stationary or declining level”. 
 
The above quote is from John Maynard Keynes, a British economist, in 1937 [1], less 
than ten years before the first baby-boomers were born. Although his timing was less 
than accurate, he got the trend right, at least for Europe, as we will demonstrate be-
low. Our paper is based on the thematic demography scenarios drawn up under the 
framework of the ESPON 3.2 project (see editors’ introduction). It consists of three 
main parts. Part one provides a summary of the evolution of demographic trends and 
their territorial variation in Europe. This information has been used as the basis for the 
development of two scenarios with a time horizon of 2030. The first one, ‘Silver Cen-
tury’, which is a roll forward baseline scenariob, is elaborated in part two of the paper. 
                                                 
a
 Corresponding author: Tel.: +44 (0) 191 246 4884. 
E-mail address: simin.davoudi@newcastle.ac.uk 
b
 The basic assumption here is the continuation of the present situation and trends and unchanged be-
haviors and policies. 
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The second one, ‘Open Borders’, is a prospective policy scenarioc and is described in 
part three.  
    
2. Scenario Base: Demographic Trends in Europe 
 
On January 1st 2009, the estimated population of the EU27 stood at 499.7 million, a 
population which, despite healthy immigration rates was, if not stationary, experienc-
ing only very slow growth [2].  Though not the ‘zero population growth’ predicted 
formerly, this relative stagnation contrasted significantly with elsewhere in the world, 
with the exception of Japan, where the population continued to increase sharplyd. This 
situation has been brought about by three decades of low fertility rates, producing 
shrinking cohorts of young people, in turn generating a ‘negative momentum’.  At its 
lowest point, there had, been more deaths than births leading, by 1995, to a natural 
decrease of 1 per 1000 population.  While the birth rate had plummeted, a long-term 
rise in longevity had suppressed the mortality rate and hence created an ageing popu-
lation.  
 
The current trends show a distinct departure from long-term trends which, from the 
beginning of the 19th century (i.e. the ‘first demographic transition’), were marked by 
rising population. The downward turn began at the end of the 1960s, known as the 
‘second demographic transition’, with the total fertility rate falling below the re-
placement rate of 2.1 per woman by 1975e.  Since then birth rates have continued to 
decrease. By the mid-1990s these stood at 1.5 births per woman compared with an 
average of 5.1 in developing countries and 3.2 and 3.4, respectively, in North African 
and Western Asian states. In countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain, the fertility 
rate was just 1.3. Natural population development has therefore had a minor impact 
on the size of population, resulting in a mere 0.04% increase per annum between 2001 
and 2005, for the EU27+f.  
 
The increase in longevity has been a continuous feature of recent European historyg. 
On average, life expectancy at birth has risen from 67 years in 1955 to almost 78 
years in 2008.  Within Europe, however, there has been a divergence in this trend evi-
dent in most Central and East European countries where the life expectancy of men 
has fallen during the post-communist period [3].   65% of this difference is due to 
excess deaths in the 15-59 year age group. While there is a gap in the life expectancy 
of women, this is no where near as marked and the average life expectancy of EU 
women now peaks 83.  The proportion of people over 65 rose from 9.5% of the total 
population in 1950 to 17.08% in 2008. This, together with the proportion of the popu-
lation over 80, is expected to continue to grow. Consequently, the old age dependency 
ratio in the EU27 is predicted to reach just short of 30% by 2015 and nearly 40% by 
2030 [4].   
 
                                                 
c
 Here the underlying assumption is that changes would occur in one or more areas of public policy. 
 
d
 Over the past half a century the world’s population has been growing faster than ever before with the 
lion’s share of this growth taking place in developing countries.  
e
 A replacement rate of at least 2.1 in developed economies is needed to produce a constant population 
in the long-term.  
f
 This refers to EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.  
g
 Infant mortality rates have also fallen.  
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Demographic restructuring relates not only to natural population change but also mi-
gration; each exhibiting different trajectories and spatial patterns. Migration has been 
the main driver of population change in Europe, accounting in 2007 for more than 
85% of population growth in the EU. Indeed, the rise in international immigration to 
Europe has been crucial in maintaining the size of the EU.  The nature of migration 
has, however, changed over the past half century representing three distinct ‘waves’: 
first, the post-war ‘guest-worker’ phenomena; second, family reunification; and 
thirdly, the emergence of a post-industrial pattern of migration.  The latter comprises: 
highly-skilled labour migration, clandestine movement (through for example illegal 
entry) and asylum seeking [5].  Numerically, and in terms of visibility, the latter two 
categories are more significant.  Estimates of ‘illegal immigrants’ in the EU range 
from four to eight million, with approximately half a million more arriving every year 
[6].   
 
Probably the most significant factor in determining the settlement choices of migrants 
to Europe, irrespective of the ‘legality’ or motivation for their movement has contin-
ued to be previous colonial ties with the country of origin.  Obviously colonialism 
conferred a common language, similar education systems and cultural connections 
which together with relationships built up during the ‘active recruitment’ period of 
post-war reconstruction have largely determined migration extra-European migration 
flows.  These include for instance the substantial movement of Algerians to France; 
Indians, Pakistanis and West Indians to the UK and, on a smaller scale, Malaccans 
and Surinamese to the Netherlands.  European countries without a comparable colo-
nial legacy have not benefited from this sort of labour input in the same way. 
 
Territorial differentiation of demographic trends  
Territorial variation across Europe is reflected in the average annual rate of population 
change.  While this averaged at 0.0-0.1% for most of the EU between 2000 and 2005, 
it rose to 1.1 for the EU27 in 2008, but this masked significant and evidently increas-
ing variation.  At one extreme is Ireland where the rate reached 12% and France 
where it reached 4.3%, while at the other extreme, the rate in Bulgaria stood at -4.8% 
and in Hungary -3.1%h.   
 
Similarly, national averages mask significant sub-national differences, such as the 
North / South divides in Italy, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria and the UKi and the East / 
West variation in Germany.  Centre / periphery divides are also evident in many coun-
tries, although interestingly some areas which are resisting the depopulation trend 
most spectacularly (such as Utrecht, the Border, Midland and Western areas of Ireland 
and the Algarve) are not ‘capital regions’.  Still, in spite of differences in the rate of 
change and the factors believed to be behind them, mortality and fertility trends across 
Europe can, in general, be seen to be convergingj.  However, convergence is less evi-
dent in migration which is impacting on regions and countries quite differently.  The 
most obvious feature has been the change in the larger Southern European states, 
which instead of being net exporters of people to north-west Europe and the ‘New 
World’ (as they were until the mid 1970s) have now become net importers, mainly as 
                                                 
 
i
 Note that in all cases noted it is the North of the country which is losing population compared to the 
South, with the exception of Italy where the reverse is occurring. 
j
 With the exception of male mortality rates in the EU-8 mentioned earlier.  
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a result of large inflows of migrants from Africa and Asiak.   
 
Since the introduction of freedom of movement within the EU, large-scale intra-
European migration has occurred with the dominant flows being from periphery to 
core, and from East to West, with Germany being one of the main recipients (see Box 
1 for further details). In the accommodation of asylum seekers, Austria and Sweden 
have been significant, relative to their population size, but less notable in gross terms. 
With regard to migration within regions, the dominant flows were from rural to urban 
areas in the period immediately after the Second World War.  By the 1970s counter-
urbanisation and other forms of de-centralisation became more pronounced in many 
areas. This trend has continued to date, at least for the increasing proportion of people 
who are retired, on higher incomes, or are flexible home-workers.  As a result, some 
European peripheries have been seriously affected by population decline and, in some 
places, by depopulation. These demographic trends have been drawn upon to develop 
two scenarios which will be presented in remaining two parts of this paper.  
 
Box 1: The transitional arrangements 
These were agreed in the two last Accession Treaties and allow Member States to temporarily re-
strict the right of workers from the EU-8 countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria 
and Romania) to freely move to another member state to work.  They aim to gradually introduce 
free movement over a seven-year period in three ‘stepped’ phases (2+3+2 years) during which dif-
ferent, increasingly strict conditions apply as to the conditions under which member states can re-
strict labour market access.  Countries may open their labour markets at any point, but must fully 
open them at the end of the seven year period (2011 for the EU-8 and 2013 for Bulgaria and Roma-
nia).  The restrictions only apply to workers: they do not apply to the self-employed. Nor do they 
restrict the rights to travel and live in another Member State. The current state of transitional ar-
rangements are very much in flux due to recessionary pressures and the decision of Ireland and 
Sweden to open up their markets and of the UK to have done so (conditionally) and more recently 
having expressed the desire to ‘rewind’.  The situation for the EU-15 and the EU-8 is critical for 
different reasons.  The EU-8 have been experiencing a decline in the working age population which 
in some regions has reached critical levels.  The World Bank [7] have forecasted that even substan-
tial immigration from the rest of the Europe and Central Asian region will not be sufficient to ad-
dress the population and labour deficit in the medium to long term.  Positive signs however have 
indicated that the richer regions of the EU-8 are starting to begun net immigration areas, still the 
population of theses countries as a whole continues to decline. The situation for Western, Southern 
and Northern regions is quite different due primarily to the recent rise in unemployment.  The re-
sponse of member states in dealing with the final phases of the transitional arrangements will be of 
enormous significance in how the scenario will play out in reality. 
  
 
 
3. Silver Century Scenario 
 
We are witnessing what the Japanese call the ‘Silver Century’, referring to the in-
crease in the number of ‘grey haired’ population. The rising proportion of older peo-
ple will be the century’s defining demographic trend. In Europe, the impact of this 
ageing population may also determine the pace of economic growth, the nature of 
politics and the sustainability of the European social model.  The scenario presented 
                                                 
k
 In 1990, of the (registered) 13 million foreigners living in the then EU-12, 8 million were from out-
side Europe, with nearly half from North Africa or Turkey. 
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below is based on the continuation of current trends, both in terms of demographic 
evolution and policy. It has been developed in response to the following strategic 
question: should current demographic, migration and labour market trends continue 
unchecked, how would Europe look in 2030? 
 
3.1 Key hypotheses  
The European population will continue to age and immigration will be very limited 
and controlled. The shrinking workforce will have to work longer hours and pay 
higher taxes to support the rising costs of health care and pensions for a growing 
number of older people.  The fiscal demands of this ‘ageing Europe’ place tremen-
dous stress on the ‘European social model’ of welfare provision which is based on a 
choice made to accept lower economic growth in return for more social protection and 
leisure time.  The social model may be modified to meet the needs of older people, yet 
will not help redress the continued falling birth-rate.  Older people will move in in-
creasing numbers to rural areas, and from North and West to Southern ‘retirement 
destinations’, where they use their ‘grey’ voting power to shift public spending away 
from nurseries, schools and playgrounds towards health care and retirement homes. 
Core-periphery and east-west demographic polarisation further accentuates as a result 
of depopulation and loss of labour force. 
 
3.2 Driving forces 
The main driving force leading to an ageing population and a shrinking and ageing 
working population is a continuation of the trend of falling total fertility rates, a trend 
continuous with a reduction in mortality rates. The outcome is increasing longevity 
and declining natural population growth.  Particular features of this driving force in-
clude: continued decline in the total period fertility rate; continued progressive ageing 
of the population; a ‘feminisation’ of population ageing with 45% of older women 
being widows and without ‘spousal support; the dominance of the 45-64 cohort in the 
European work force; increasing demographic segregation with some older people 
living in poverty and isolation with others residing in retirement villages in desirable 
locations; and, continuing migration into the EU but mainly confined to larger metro-
politan areas. 
 
3.3 Development of the Scenario  
In the decade and a half since the turn of the century fertility rates have continued on 
a downward trajectory. The average fertility rate has dropped to 1.2 (0.3% less than 
the rate in 2004). Meanwhile, life expectancy has continued to rise. Indeed, at birth, 
life expectancy in 2015 stands at 82 years for men, 87 years for women. The propor-
tion of European population above the age of 60 has also increased from 21 percent in 
2000, to between 8 to 15 percentage points higher. In other words, the total population 
aged above 60 is approximately1.5 times the level it was at the beginning of the cen-
tury. Similarly, the proportion of the population aged below 20 has declined through 
the 2010s, but it is not directly a mirror image of the proportion of elderly. The pro-
portion of children and teenagers in Europe has declined from its 2000 figure of 23 
percent to 15 percent in 2015. 
 
Demographic change has also started to be reflected in economic change. The declin-
ing number of workers has slowed down economic growth, with the ageing of the 
population adversely affecting consumer demand, asset values, corporate profits, and 
balance sheets.  This occurs more heavily in some markets than others - in mature 
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markets such as cars and home appliances, sales have shrunk year after year. This is 
because, in its early stages, depopulation is characterised by the shrinking of the 
youngest age groups, and thus demand for products and services consumed by the 
young is the first to decline. In Germany, for instance, the cohort born between 1995 
and 1999 is only 47% as large as the cohort born between 1970 and 1974.  Financial 
services providing top-up pensions and second mortgages targeting more financially 
secure older people have flourished. As a proportion of the labour market, the service 
sector has continued to grow rapidly. The majority of new ‘working class’ employ-
ment now involves servicing the private or domestic ‘needs’ of middle class older 
people. Also in evidence has been a growing intergenerational division in service sec-
tor delivery, with a steep increase in occupational demand focusing on providing for 
the needs of a growing elderly population. This has been accompanied by a boom in 
professional ‘caring’ qualifications.   
 
Despite a rise in home ownership among older people, there has been a steep contrac-
tion of housing demand. This has undermined property values creating both reverse 
wealth effects at the household level and balance sheet weakness among financial in-
stitutions that hold mortgage-backed assets. This is seen to be related to a 20% decline 
in the 25-44 age group across Europe, with certain regions, such as Spain and Italy, 
seeing more radical declines of 36 percent and 30 percent respectively.  
 
By 2030 the number of people aged over 60 is some 40% higher than at the turn of the 
century. In addition, there has been a marked rise in the very old. In the UK for in-
stance, compared with the 300 people aged 100+ in 1950, in 2030 there is a growing 
expectation that living for a century will be the norm for thousands of people. How-
ever, changes to the age structure are most marked in Germany. Here, by 2030, people 
over 65 accounted for almost half the adult population, compared with one-fifth at the 
beginning of the century. Furthermore, as the country’s birth rate has failed to re-
cover, the under 35 population has shrunk about twice as fast as the older population 
has grown. The net result is that the total population, 82 million at the start of the cen-
tury, has declined to 71.5 million by 2030. The number of people of working age has 
fallen by a full quarter, from 40 to 30 million.  These trends have been replicated to 
varying degrees across the EU. The key factor continues to be a failure of population 
replacement, producing the fall in the total population and working age population. 
There may be some correlation in the rising longevity and falling fertility, so that at 
the same time as life spans continue to rise, so fertility continues to fall as women 
leave childbirth later and later. By 2030 the total fertility rate is barely at 1 per 
woman.  The combination of this decline in birth rates and the increase in the life ex-
pectancy of people has created the ‘gerontological drift’l. 
 
At the beginning of the century it was estimated that by 2030 the age at which full 
retirement benefits start would have risen to the mid-70s in all developed countries, 
while benefits for healthy pensioners would be substantially lower than their 2005 
levels. It was also argued that fixed retirement ages for people in reasonable physical 
and mental health would have been abolished to prevent the pension burden on the 
working population from becoming unbearable. These predictions and concerns arose 
from a young and middle aged working population who suspected that there would 
                                                 
l
 Characterised by an increase over time in the proportion of older people relative to younger people. 
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not be enough pension provision when they reached traditional retirement age. But 
between 2005 and 2030, continued and growing electoral pressure from older voters, 
meant that pension reform was not politically feasible. Consequently, the estimates 
made by the World Bank in the 1990s [8] that spending on public pensions would in-
crease from under 9% to over 16% of GDP between 1990 and 2040, have proved a 
fair evaluation. By 2030 pension costs have reached 15% of GDP. 
 
3.4 Macro-economic, social and political impacts 
The ‘baby boom’ generation has been retiring in large numbers resulting in the ‘emp-
tying out’ of workplaces. This has been particularly noticeable in the area of public 
sector service employment. Despite various policy measures to retain workers, older 
people have been drawing their pensions much earlier than the retirement age. This 
reflects the growing economic power of older people, who not only continue to draw 
pensions based on transfers from a decreasing workforce, but have been able to nego-
tiate and maintain subsidies on many aspects of life, such as transport and entry to 
cultural events.  Some policy makers have argued that such subsidies need preserving 
given the propensity of older people to save rather than spend, with all efforts needing 
to be made to retain older people’s stake in the functioning of the economy. 
 
One outcome of this is that less than 4% of men remain in the workforce by the age of 
65.  The level of economic inactivity has also remained high, well above the 2004 
figure when 40% of Europeans of working age were economically inactive. The con-
tinued early exit rates from the labour market have accentuated by late entries with a 
continued emphasis on higher education extending for longer periods.  Consequently, 
the number of workers has fallen while the number of those dependent on them has 
risen. By 2015, the number of pensioners has grown relative to the number of work-
ers, with 55 pensioners for every 100 workers (compared to 35 people of pensionable 
age for every 100 of working age in 2004). Thus the dependency rate stands at 2 peo-
ple in work for every one in retirement. Inter-generational conflict resulting from this 
‘burden’ has been the subject of much trade union debate, with both threatened and 
actual action.  Concerns about the declining competitiveness of the European econ-
omy relative to younger and growing economies continue. Developments in research 
(R&D) and communication technology (ICT) remain the hope for its future global 
ranking, as well as reliance on technological advances to deal with persistent labour 
scarcity problems. In the field of long-term geriatric care, temporary work visas for 
migrant workers have become a typical way of ensuring adequate staff. This has lead 
to allegations of the misuse of the guest workers, though there seems to be no short-
age yet of migrants seeking these positions. 
 
The consequences of the ageing of the population have not been confined to the la-
bour market and related issues: the changing demographic balance has affected voting 
behaviour and subsequently political developments.  The increasing power of the 
‘grey vote’ has effectively blocked reforms to pension schemes and to proposals to 
increase the retirement age. Similarly, as the number of retired people has out num-
bered younger voters, older people have become a determining force in shifting public 
spending priorities away from provision of services commonly associated with the 
young, such as nurseries, schools and playgrounds, towards services for the elderly, 
such as retirement homes and health care. At the same time, spending on the latter 
years of life has risen as the proportion of users of these services has increased rela-
tive to younger people.  These changes in spending begin to be reflected in cultural 
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and media output, with a marked reduction in emphasis on youth evident at the outset 
of the century.   
 
‘Nightmare visions’ depicting overwhelming demands on future health care budgets 
of an ageing population, popular at the end of the last centurym, have not materialised 
to the extent that had been predicted.  Improvements in health and lifestyle of a large 
sector of older adults have resulted in the dominance of the so-called ‘receding hori-
zon scenario’, where the onset and progress of disease and disability have been post-
poned to precisely the same extent as death itself, so that the number of years of dis-
eased and disabled existence have remained unchanged.  The ‘plateau effect’ in some 
regions, and for a minority of people, has been further reduced in accordance with the 
‘compressed morbidity scenario’, where both disability and death are postponed but 
the former more so than the latter, so that the interval between the onset of chronic 
disease or disability and death has been shortened.  However, in poorer socio-
economic groups, higher mortality rates among men have persisted, and among 
women an extended period of dependency has become the norm, often with minimal 
and remote forms of support. 
 
Social differentiation has not been reduced during the ageing of Europe’s population, 
in fact socio-economic division – without policy intervention - has visibly multiplied 
in the period of ‘remaining life’ (age cohort 65-95+). Amongst higher income groups, 
live-in carers and domestic workers for older adults have become increasingly popular 
and large homes, designed with ‘carers quarters’ attached, have been developed 
throughout the EU. Conversely, for lower income groups, ‘distance surveillance cen-
tres’ have emerged. These sparsely staffed centres monitor the homes and movements 
of elderly people. Such living arrangements have done little to confront the problem 
of isolation in old age. Indeed, depression in the very elderly has increased as these 
forms of technology have not been used to maximise social or community contact. 
For all income groups the long-term consequences of a continued rise in marital and 
kinship insecurity has undermined family care of the elderly. In general, all aspects of 
how life is organised have been changing as a consequence of the demographic shift. 
Housing, transport and other forms of infrastructure have started to take different 
forms with more services provided at shorter distances in localities to make them 
more accessible to older people.   
 
3.5 Regional and territorial impacts 
The economic impact of the ageing population has varied significantly at the national 
level, as some member states and regions have felt the impact of ageing much sooner 
and more strongly than others. In countries with more serious pension problems (such 
as Germany) public debt has grown to over 60% of the GDP.  Within the EU, Italy 
and Germany have seen their working age population drop by 47% and 43% respec-
tively.  By contrast, France and the UK have experienced less drastic declines of 26% 
percent and 15%. In countries where the rising costs of old age has been more severe 
(such as France, Italy and Spain), intergenerational conflict has been taking the form 
                                                 
m
 The ‘nightmare scenario’ where the age at which disease and disability strikes remains as it was in at 
the end of the last century, but death is postponed, formed the basis for the claims that the ageing popu-
lation would result in a much extended period of frailty and dependency leading to of an exponential 
growth of health care costs.  This was based on the apparent constant ‘high’ in health care costs from 
age 80 onwards in many member states (based on data from the Economic Policy Committee of the 
European Commission) [9], depending on the length of the ‘plateau effect’.  
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of so-called ‘age riots’ which have taken place intermittently in certain metropolitan 
areas.   
 
Patterns of fertility decline at the EU level have converged, though at different rates, 
taking place firstly in North and West Europe (from the 1970s), followed by South 
and then Central and East Europe.  Thus a similar transition has been occurring but at 
different time scales.  Ageing has been felt first in North and West Europe, but has 
been developing rapidly across the Mediterranean, where life expectancies are among 
the longest in the EU.  In Central and East Europe, where mortality rates had in-
creased at the turn of the century, life expectancy rates have started to fall into line 
with the rest of the EU thus producing similar ageing trends.  These have been exac-
erbated however as a result of intra-European migration.  Since the end of quotas for 
East to West immigration in 2011, demographic imbalances in areas away from the 
economic centres of Central and Eastern European countries have become serious, 
with – for instance - a shortage of working  people in caring and other medical occu-
pations leading to service shortfalls.  The only countries where there has not been an 
overall fall in population over this period are France and the UK, largely due to in-
creased concentration and a continued influx of people to the conurbations around the 
Isle de France and Greater London. 
 
At the EU level, the East / West, North / South, centre / periphery and urban / rural 
divisions within the EU have started to take on a significant age element. The eastern, 
southern, rural areas, and periphery have become either magnets for older people (in 
the case of the South) or areas where older people have been increasingly left behind, 
as younger cohorts move to economically more dynamic areas.  Affluent older people 
are more mobile and have more diverse lifestyles. As such, they have begun to choose 
‘where to retire’ and, increasingly, they have chosen to retire in areas with lower 
crime rates and good access to services (particularly health care and hospitals), and 
with a pleasant climate. Indeed, residential segregation by age is apparent at the EU 
and national level. Regarding the former, across Europe, older people are moving to 
Southern European ‘retirement destinations’.   
 
At the national level, there are signs of ‘age’ segregation with retired people concen-
trating in rural areas, although there is a residual (mainly low income) older popula-
tion remaining in urban areas. There are also an increasing number of gated type 
communities, which designate age or ‘no children’ conditions on residents. These 
trends are producing a growing spatial differentiation by generation. Overall, unregu-
lated population movements to and within the EU have exacerbated, rather than miti-
gated the effects of the underlying ageing trends in the period 2005 to 2030.   
 
3.6 The final picture: Europe in 2030 
In 2030 the balance of power politically, economically and spatially is increasingly 
dominated by older people. In territorial terms this is apparent in a division of space 
with younger people being concentrated around urban working areas and retirees dis-
tributed across suburban and rural spaces. At a macro level there are also differences 
in the age distribution of the population, with Southern areas of the EU becoming re-
tirement destinations on a much larger scale than was apparent at the turn of the cen-
tury. It has become the norm to work in the large European Metropolitan Areas 
(MEGA, see editors’ introduction) of the core during working years, and retire away 
from these areas relatively early, in spite of continuing longevity and related debate 
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about what the average retirement age should be. Resistance to large-scale or ‘direc-
tive’ immigration has meant that the ageing of the workforce and population, which 
began at the end of the last century, has shown itself to be largely irreversible in na-
ture, and gains from international immigration in its legal form have been relatively 
insignificant, except in the cities where the populations were already younger.  In 
Eastern Europe the loss from emigration, particularly of younger peoples has contrib-
uted to the ageing effect.  Attempts to contain and control illegal immigration contin-
ued to flounder, but the informal economy has continued to flourish – including the 
service sector and care of the elderly. Demographic changes have had a continued 
negative impact on labour force rates, most noticeably in the East.  Since 2010 the net 
intake of young people entering the work force fell substantially, reducing their labour 
force participation rates relative to workers over the age of 45.  However the work 
force has been ‘squeezed’ at both ends, due to the popularity of late entry (higher edu-
cation) and early exit (early retirement), at least among higher socio-economic 
groups.  Between 2010 and 2025 technological adaptations partially compensated for 
declining work force participation rates as efforts were made to try and maintain the 
participation of some older workers in ‘knowledge based’ work.  
 
4. Open Borders Scenario  
 
At the turn of the century there is a perceptible, continued decline in Europe’s share of 
the world population [10].  This shrinkage, combined with the ageing of its popula-
tion, contributes to growing concerns about the competitive future of the continent.  In 
the following ‘prospective policy’ scenario, European leaders instigate specific meas-
ures to compensate for the perceived demographic deficit by actively encouraging 
immigration.  The subsequent opening of borders provides the context for attempts to 
counter existing trends, while the possible outcomes of the policy in the period up to 
2030 are outlined.  
 
4.1 Key hypothesis  
The hypothesis for the Open Borders scenario is that a proactive policy change is a 
response to predictions that the population of Europe will continue to age as mortality 
rates decline and birth rates continue to fall.  This had been expected to result in a fal-
ling total population which would be increasingly ageing and in sharp contrast with 
neighbouring regions, such as the countries of the Maghreb, where a relatively young 
population would continue to rise.  Measures are taken following a series of specific 
triggers, in addition to responses to these general trends, to reduce the restrictions on 
external immigration and manage an increased volume of immigration drawn from 
outside of Europe.   Migration between countries and regions is however allowed to 
develop in a laissez faire manner resulting in the impact of the scenario being felt dif-
ferently from region to region. 
 
4.2 Driving forces 
The main driving force is the concern about demographic trends which were seen to 
be contributing to a growing disparity between an ageing population and a shrinking 
labour force.  This leads to a desire to use migration from outside the EU more effec-
tively in order to fill the skills and labour gap.  Consequently, following a retraction 
of the European economy after the 2009-10 recession, which resulted in a temporary 
protectionist approach to migration, concerns resurfaced and an open and actively 
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promoted immigration policy developed, resulting in significant alterations to the tra-
jectory of demographic and  labour market trends that had been in place before 2005. 
 
4.3 Development of the Scenario  
In 2007, the EU Vice President (Franco Frattini) had pre-empted this policy trend with 
his assertion that for Europe to continue its economic development, and rise to the 
challenge of globalization, further selective external migration was needed.  Without 
migration the number of people living in the EU would be set to decline in decades to 
come, with an increasing number over 65 years of age and an unprecedented loss of 
workers as the ‘baby boom’ generation reached retirement during the 2020s.  Euro-
stat’s prognoses concurred with predictions for the period up to 2030 that three quar-
ters of all European regions would have no alternative to immigration as a primary 
growth factor [11].  The financial impacts of allowing these trends to continue without 
seeking actively to mitigate them through migration would be too costly. 
 
Specific triggers contributing to the policy change towards the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century included a series of amnesties granted unilaterally by individual 
countries to illegal immigrants.  Their actions inevitably impacted on neighbouring 
member states and led to calls to agree a joint approach, in partnership with interna-
tional organizations, with respect to the opening of the EU’s external borders.  Conse-
quently, shortly after 2010 there were fewer restrictions on migration from other con-
tinents. The rising flows were managed in a reasonably effective way, despite the res-
ervations of individual countries, such as the UK.  The aspect of migration which re-
mained virtually unregulated, except indirectly through regional recruitment policy, 
was that of final destination. This means that the ultimate impact of this scenario dif-
fers according to region. 
 
As popular concerns in some European countries about immigration which had re-
surfaced during the 2009-10 recession began to recede, more longstanding anxieties 
about skill shortages and the ageing of the population started to reassert themselves.  
This coincided with a change in the output of various international agencies which 
began to focus more on the positive developmental potential of remittances sent home 
from migrants and less on the negative effect of the so-called ‘brain drain’. These 
changes resulted in several bilateral arrangements between the individual ‘sending’ 
and ‘receiving’ countries as well as provisional agreements at the supranational level.   
The first tentative move towards an open border policy had already been initiated with 
the adoption of the European Blue Card directive by 24 member states in May 2009, 
designed to attract highly skilled workers from outside the EU.  There were delays in 
transposing the system into national law despite the fact that the scheme was already 
considered to have ‘watered down’n and friction continued relating to Central and 
East European states concerns about fair access to European labour markets during 
the post accession periodo.  The UK, Ireland and Denmark opted out of the system at 
first, the former preferring to rely on its own national policy based on a tiered points 
system and probationary periods for new citizens.  However, between 2011 and 2020 
it became increasingly difficult to maintain and police internal borders or to control 
movements between the countries of the EU.  A series of agreements resulted in the 
                                                 
n
 The directive was agreed only by allowing each member state to decide how many EU work visas 
(‘blue cards’) it would issue. 
o
 East and Central European citizens wishing to work in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Den-
mark still faced restrictions in 2009.  
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further development of the system which intended to strengthen the opening of the 
border for the whole territory. This was refined over time in an attempt to respond to 
territorial coverage and specific skill shortages. 
 
Nonetheless, from 2010 net immigration rates did grow in the majority of European 
countries, though clearly certain regions and countries attracted more.  Large centres 
in Spain and other Mediterranean countries became home to a growing number of un-
registered workers from North Africa.   Along the Atlantic Arc large conurbations act-
ing as ‘gateways’ or ‘intercontinental hubs’ between the western fringe of Europe and 
North West Africa were emerging.  The metropolitan areas of the North Sea Region 
and North-West Europe were to see the greatest boosts in population, being most at-
tractive to younger migrants at all skill levels and resulting in a counterbalancing of 
the ageing process.  There was also moderate population development in corridors 
spreading out from the MEGAs in these regions and in the agglomerations in the Al-
pine and Germanic regions. 
 
The influx of younger migrants was not felt evenly however, and many of the regions 
which had been most badly affected by falling birth rates and a loss of younger work-
ers continued to find it difficult to attract skilled, or indeed any, workers in sufficient 
numbers.  Thus several Eastern port cities, much of the Northern periphery, the 
Southern Baltic and rural areas of Central and Eastern Europe continued to see their 
populations stagnate, and in more remote regions, fall.  In the latter case this was in 
spite of moves to encourage migration from other regions after immigration from the 
Republics of the former Soviet Union began to dwindle after 2010. 
 
Across EU territory as a whole though, two trends became apparent by 2020.  The 
first one was a deepening of the European ageing population which was characterised 
by a growing proportion of the indigenous population being very aged and frail.  Sec-
ondly, there was evidence of a partial reversal of falling fertility rates, following an 
influx of younger persons from outside Europe.  Together these trends began to make 
significant impacts on the EU demographic structure, resisting the overall shrinkage 
and loss of human capital that had been predicted without the policy shift. 
 
4.4 Macro-economic, social and political impacts 
A move away from ‘Fortress Europe’ has undoubtedly enjoyed certain pay-offs in 
terms of maintaining a level of economic competitiveness and correcting, to certain 
extent, the age imbalances and depopulation for the EU as a whole, which were set to 
undermine the future of the continent.  But despite the expansion of the age pyramid 
in the younger age groups and related curbs on the growth of the dependency ratio, 
there have also been costs. In areas where most migrants have settled, concerns over 
integration and social inequities have arisen.  There have also been spatial inequalities 
in development between countries, regions and between rural and urban areas. 
 
Looking first at the broader picture, the growing number of immigrants could be seen 
to have stimulated the economy of Europe throughout the 2020s.  This occurred 
through both a continuation of trends in the service sectors (such as health and social 
welfare) where immigrants had traditionally played a large part, and also the creation 
of new jobs in response to the demands of their own population groups, most notably 
in commerce and transport. Following the influx of younger people, the upturn in the 
birth rate affected the labour market too, notably after 2015.  However, by 2020, a 
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reduction in the participation of younger women in the work force was balanced by an 
increase in the labour activity rate of immigrant and older workers.  The continuation 
of the latter’s involvement was also the consequence of a rise across much of the EU 
in the pension age, reflecting the ageing of the indigenous population. Across the 
board there has been an acceptance of immigration and its benefits and this has been 
reflected in an increase in mixed marriage.  
 
However, the dominant pattern has been a concentration of immigrants in separate 
areas and separate sectors, with integration locally and nationally least evident in un-
skilled and unqualified population groups.  There were sporadic outbreaks of conflict 
between factions in the 2010s, though this was not widespread and tended to be con-
centrated in urban areas, especially those based in old industrial and eastern regions. 
An obvious source of inter-generational tension has been the fact that while the older 
generation is composed mainly by the native population, the young generation is sig-
nificantly made up of those of foreign origin.  In areas traditionally attractive to im-
migration, such as Luxemburg and regions of Germany and Spain, the proportion of 
younger persons of non-indigenous origin has risen to over 50%.  While in macro 
terms this has had counter-balancing effects, at micro level there is new competition 
between investments in housing (where demand for affordable accommodation be-
came critical) and education, particularly relating to the specific needs of new immi-
grant groups at the school level, and the care and retirement spending on older indige-
nous people.  
 
The attraction of the vast majority of new migrants to areas which were already heav-
ily concentrated led to further congestion and friction relating to the adequacy of ex-
isting supply and the construction of new developments.  Naturally, new settlements 
resulted over time in changes in political representation and forms of expression, with 
movements reflecting the interests and priorities of the new population groups.  These 
groups were by no means united though, with different affinities resulting in a number 
of factions.  Differences reflected variation in ethnicity, religion and variation in the 
degree of contact maintained with home communities.  To a certain extent this en-
abled an indirect element of divide and rule in containing the demands of the new 
communities by the host community. 
 
On an international level, the flows of migrants between non-European countries and 
the EU necessitated a series of agreements seeking to address demands to promote 
‘circular migration’ and avoid ‘brain drain’ problems in the ‘donor’ countries.  These 
issues proved difficult to address though, and accords relating to education and inno-
vation transfer were the product of some fairly protracted periods of international ten-
sion, especially within and between countries of North African and the Middle East.  
By the end of the 2020s however, global interdependency had reached new levels 
through the use of migration as a policy tool. 
 
4.5 Regional and territorial impacts 
Impacts at the territorial level have differed from total population impacts in a funda-
mental way: at the territorial level former trends have not been challenged, but rather 
been reinforced.  This is a result of the concentration of immigration within the EU in 
existing dominant conglomerations.  Consequently, demographic development has 
continued to favour metropolitan regions of the North, West and Southern countries 
while rural regions, most especially those in Central and Eastern Europe have contin-
 14
ued, with some exceptions, on the path towards depopulation.  The contraction felt in 
these regions has meant that there has been a continued need for Structural Fund sup-
port from 2010s and into the 2020s. 
 
Settlement destinations have continued to be influenced by previous colonial and lin-
guistic connections. Indeed, migratory movements have further strengthened the posi-
tion of the English language as the dominant language for both Europeans and immi-
grants from outside Europe, for skilled workers in particular. In the UK, the immigra-
tion surge impacted on some rural areas and more accessible parts of Wales and Scot-
land, as well as London and larger urban areas traditionally attractive to immigrants.  
Structurally the country’s demographic profile has been altered with the younger age 
bands expanded and the population continuing to grow, though some neglected areas 
of industrial decay have remained in demographic decline.   
 
At a national level, France has experienced greater population increases due to a com-
bination of high immigration, mainly from North and West Africa, bolstered by posi-
tive natural growth.  A similar picture has emerged in the islands of Malta and Cyprus 
as well as the Netherlands and Southern regions of Scandinavia.  By 2030, Switzer-
land had one of the highest proportions of foreign residents in Europe, as it did at the 
beginning of the century. Germany, Belgium, Italy and Greece have been able to 
counteract negative demographic trends with modest population growth, though 
growth is unevenly distributed.  Of the Central and Eastern European countries, Po-
land and the Czech Republic have also experienced slight growth with immigration, 
mainly from the Ukraine and Belarus, offsetting natural population losses.  Spain as a 
whole has found it more difficult to compensate for the natural fall in population with 
net immigration than other Mediterranean countries.  Madrid and other urban areas 
have proved magnets for migration and growth, but regions such as Galicia have con-
tinued to see population stagnate and age quite sharply.  Demographic stability has 
been maintained in Ireland and Finland, atypically more as a result of relatively buoy-
ant birth rates than net migration gains.  In Poland and Hungary, the metropolitan re-
gions of Warsaw, Poznan, Krakow and Budapest showed population gains by 2030, 
but other regions shed populations.  The population of the Baltic states continued to 
fall in total, though the capitals, Vilnius in particular remained relatively buoyant.  
The most radical losses, with persistently high emigration rates, were seen in Bulgaria 
and Romania.  In Turkey, emigration remained high, but unlike the latter two coun-
tries, fertility rates were also high (see Box 2 ). 
 
 
 
Box 2: The role of Turkey in the demographic future of Europe 
A key factor in the likelihood of either scenario unfolding and the future trajectory of the age profile 
of the EU must be the accession or not of Turkey to the EU.  According to a recent report underta-
ken for the World Bank, “…the largest variable in future European migration patterns in both West-
ern Europe and Western ECA is Turkey, in which most of the future population growth and addition 
to the labour forces in Europe are expected to take place.” [12] Following this analysis the predicted 
continued growth of the Turkish population (World Bank forecasts expect this to exceed 100 million 
by 2050) would be sufficient to ‘cover the predicted 12 million person population deficit expected 
within the EU’. [13]  Looking at the future demographic development of Europe in economic terms 
and from a ‘human resource’ perspective like this however does not allow for the complexities of 
social, cultural and political factors which determine decision making in migration policy.  Fears of 
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terrorism, continued tensions arising from the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, religious sensitivities 
and historical differences make the future opening up of borders between Turkey, Greece and Bul-
garia problematic and somewhat unlikely, at least in the near future. 
 
 
4.6 The final picture: Europe in 2030 
By the late 2020s attempts to modify external in-migration by destination and eco-
nomic sector’s requirements were made.  However, a previous lack of regulation of 
internal movements has meant that although the extent of population decline and age-
ing projected at the turn of the century for 2030 has been significantly less than would 
have been the case without pro-migration policy intervention, the impacts have been 
uneven.  Therefore, while the demographic and economic position of the EU can be 
seen to have been retained, this has been felt primarily in the pre-existent economic 
powerhouses, the MEGAs.  The demographic profile of less favoured areas has re-
mained unchallenged and most have continued to decline. Specifically, some 130 mil-
lion new immigrants have settled in the more successful ‘heart’ of Europe demarcated 
by the Stockholm and Oslo in the North, through Paris and London down to Southern 
Germany and Western Austria.  From this zone of economic activity, the economic 
support of a greater number of older people across the continent has been generated 
over the 20 years that the policy has been in operation.   
 
Directly in its contribution to the labour market and indirectly to social welfare and 
insurance systems, the immigration policy has been broadly beneficial.  There have 
been social costs, but these have been less severe than had been predicted by some 
who had initially resisted the opening of borders.  Undoubtedly there have been prob-
lems related to integration, spatial segregation and differentiation by country of ori-
gin, but this has been felt mainly in the metropolitan areas and have responded in a 
few cases to imaginative integrative policy initiatives.  Certainly social and cultural 
changes have not been entirely negative, as the increase in contact between countries 
of origin and Europe have stimulated cultural expansion and exchange as re-
emigration and movement of Europeans has grown and become progressively the 
norm by 2030. At a macro level the final picture spatially can be portrayed as an ex-
pansion of the productive area in the large metropolises at the expense of outlying re-
gions.  Therefore, while the ageing and shrinking of Europe’s economy have been 
partially resisted, territorial divisions have been more or less reinforced.  In the ab-
sence of policies to direct the destination of external immigration, the depopulation of 
problematic areas has proved intractable.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The two scenarios presented may both appear as undesirable views of the future for 
different reasons.  The ageing of Europe and changes in the ‘dependency ratio’ is of-
ten presented as a ‘nightmare scenario’, while the increase in immigration, particu-
larly ‘illegal’ immigration is frequently portrayed as having the potential to over-
whelm ‘host‘ communities and cultures.  This, however, is despite the fact that in 
Western societies both the concept of ‘family planning’p  and that of ‘freedom of 
movement’ are integral to notions of fundamental human rights.  Neither of the sce-
narios is necessarily negative, as long as population decline and ageing is managed 
                                                 
p
 This means the autonomy to use contraception to limit family size. 
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adequately. The ‘silver century’ scenario, for example, could have potential environ-
mental pay-offs if supported by continued innovation in green technology.  With re-
gard to the open borders scenario, developments in mass communications and trans-
port make increased cross-national movements inevitable irrespective of attempts to 
control them.  Ironically, large scale ‘enforced’ migrations and settlements in the past 
have contributed to the flow of ‘voluntary’ migration today.   
 
Concerns raised by both scenarios are partly a result of the tendency of both young 
people and migrants to move to large metropolitan areas for work and consequently 
settle in already crowded centres.  What does appear clear from both scenarios is that 
without enticements, either fiscal or other, to move to areas suffering depopulation, a 
laissez faire approach to population movement, whether indigenous or not, will not 
address the problems faced by struggling peripheral areas.  Even with the opening of 
external borders the EU will face a similarly unbalanced developmental pattern in the 
future to that posed by the ‘baseline’ silver century one.  If the possibility of signifi-
cant ‘environmental migration’, due to an upsurge in the frequency of climate induced 
extreme weather events is not to be discounted, the argument for considering new 
ways of actively managing migration flows and settlement patterns becomes more 
pressing for the  good of future generations. 
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